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SPECIAL COMMENT
A NEW LOOK AT COMMON LAW MARRIAGES
IN FLORIDA
In publishing the following comment, the Miami Law Quarterly is departingfrom its usual policy of publishing only the work of students attending our own
law school. The author, Arthur Rothstein, studied under the guidance of
Professor McDougal at Yale University and has written this comment as an
example of the widely-discussed McDougal approach to legal theory. Briefly
stated, Professor McDougal's approach is sociological, and attempts to relate
the development of any field of law to the human and governmental forces
which constantly interact. Professor McDougal has found it necessary to develop
new terminology to accurately describe certain new concepts.
We believe this comment will be of interest both to legal theorists and to
those concerned with the substantive law set forth.
INTRODUCTION-VALUE ORIENTATION AS A NEW APPROACH
The lawyer is a decision maker. He must decide what the "law"
is in his case and how he must prove and argue the case so as to obtain
a judicial ruling favorable to his client. A Flow of Decision study,' the
new approach used in this paper, is a very practical aid to the lawyer in
his endeavors along these lines. Through this approach he can find, very
easily, the events similar to his case at hand, the technical theory which
can be applied to it, and the previous court holdings and their effects-
thereby being in a better position to serve his client, himself, and the
society in which he lives.
The members of society are intermeshed by the interrelations and
activities carried on between people who are seeking various values. While
infinitely varied in their particulars, these values can be generalized into
eight overall categories: affection, power, wealth, skill, enlightenment, well-
being, rectitude, and respect. 2
As these values are strived for, various decisions must be made to
determine the course of action which would be the most effective in
reaching the desired goal. Each individual, whether for himself or in
an official capacity, is constantly making these decisions, which include
both positive actions and limits on actions to be taken.3
1. The author prefers this terminology in that it differentiates the ordinary study
of case from the McDougal theoretical approach-wherein research and teaching of an
overall approach to social studies is applied to the field of law.
2. The underlying theory employed in this paper is that expounded by Professors
McDougal and Lasswell of Yale University Law School. Briefly, this theory involves
a systematic approach to the study of social sciences, so that comparative studies of
the same problem can be made in different areas of the world. See MeDougal, The
Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes, 61 YALE L.J. 915 (1952).
3. The individual decides, as well as his particular goals, the type of conduct
which should be carried on to reach these values, and the limits to be put on the
conduct directed toward these various goals. A member of an organized group.
whether small or large, makes similar decisions, however, these are in the context of
the organization's goals, conduct and limits. For example, as representatives of his
society, the individual, at various levels of government, makes decisions which are
designed to further the community's values.
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The legislature is the part of society's Formal Authority which estab-
lishes the community's values by various written prescriptions as to pre-
ferred conduct on the part of the individual. It also prescribes the policy
limits beyond which no action can be taken, for if the limits arc violated
community coercions are to apply by sanctions whose severity varies with
the sanctity of the limits.
Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe for all possible
relations between the vast numbers that make up a modern society, there
is a branch of the Formal Authority, the courts, which will give the
community's decision as to which values, ideas of conduct, and limits of
conduct will prevail whenever individuals or groups are in conflict over
these matters.
The differences of opinion, which may arise because the legislative
prescriptions existing on the issue need interpretations as to particular
facts, or because none exist at all, will be presented to the courts, with
each party offering his claims as to the events which occurred and the
technical legal theories in a manner designed to elicit the most favorable
response from the judge. The judge, as the decision maker of a case,
will be influenced in his response by his personal predispositions, and by
the environment of the case, which includes the claims of both sides,
their objectives, the events as the judge sees them, and the response of
other decision makers, both of his and other jurisdictions.
The effects of a response will be felt at several levels. There will be
the immediate effect upon the interested parties, whose goals and claims
may be upheld or denied. The response will have a wider impact in
that it sets the judicial prescription as to the community's notions of the
proper values, conduct, and limits in these particular circumstances. It
further may affect future responses of other decision makers who are
presented with the same or similar events by parties who invoke the
Formal Authority's favorable decision of their claims as to community
values.
An examination of a number of these responses will establish with
significant clarity that to which the decision maker is responding in the
environment of a case, in the light of his elicited predispositions on a
particular issue, or in general. The study will show the events, claims,
technical theory, parties invoking the Formal Authority, plaintiffs' and
defendants' objectives, and the responses of other decision makers, as well
as the effect and trend of the various responses.
A Flow of Decision study in this form will enable a better under-
standing of the problems, responses, and cffects in any area of the law.
Such an understanding allows a new dccision maker to have a clear picture
of the values at stake in an issue, so that he can clarify his own values,
and thus be able to decide on the best community policy to apply through
any particular response.
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The subject matter of this Flow of Decision study deals with a phase
of affection value. The need for affection is basic to man, therefore
the desire and search for it is a universal one. In our society the relation
of affection between the opposite sexes is channelized in the institution
of marriage.
The process leading to the formation of marriage, courtship, is the
focus of a good portion of society's attention. The methods of formation
have been prescribed and ritualized. Society provides varied means of
terminating such a relationship whcn thc affection between the parties
has ended.
This study deals with the problem arising originally out of the scope
or primary value of affection as crystalized in the marital relation, particu.
larly-the formation of marriage.
COMMON LAW MARRIACE-DISRECARD OF STATUTORY FORMALITIES
The legislature of Florida has prescribed certain formalities which
should be carried out in order for a marriage to be formed. However,
these marriage laws are not exclusionary, they are merely directory. The
Supreme Court of Florida has held that since the statutes were merely
directory, common-law marriage is valid in Florida(6). 4
Because common-law marriages are valid, such marriages can be
formed in Florida-by-passing all legal requirements of the statutes. As
a result, there have evolved judicial rulings as to the formalities required
for the establishment of marriage by common-law. The basic judicially
established formalities of a common-law marriage were stated by the Florida
Supreme Court in Chaves v. Chaves(l1) as follows:
There are at least two essentials of a common-law marriage;(1) mutual consent, and (2) capacity. It is the agreement
itself, and not the form in which it is couched, which constitutes
the contract, and the words used or the ceremony performed are,
like cohabitation and repute, merely evidence of marriage. There
must be an agreement to become husband and wife immediately
from the time when the mutual consent is given.
Of course, unlike statutory formalities, whether the common-law ones
have been satisfied or not cannot be known until a judicial determination
occurs.
LECISLATIvE ENACTMENTS
Procedure
The statutes of Florida5 establish a formal process by which persons,
so desiring, can become husband and wife. The process for a ceremonial
4. To facilitate the study of the Florida cases involving common-law marriages,
the writer has given each case a symbolic notation. The key to the notations will be
found in the chronological case table at the end of the article, and will aid in a
discussion of the parties, claims, objectives, events and effects of the cases.5. Florida statutes governing marriage are I'LA. STAT. §§ 741.01-741.22 (1953).
The bigamy statutes are FLA. STAT. §§ 799.01-03 (1953).
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marriage is as follows. A marriage license is issued by the County Judge
upon the couple's meeting the statutory requirements as to age, physical
examination and blood tests. The applicants for a license must satisfy
the judge that they are above twenty-one. If one or both are younger
than twenty-one, written consent to the marriage must be given by the
parents or guardian of the under-age party. Anyone under age who has
had a previous marriage is exempt from the consent requirement.
Before a license can be issued, the applicants must have a blood test
and physical examination to discover syphilis within thirty days prior
to the application. The certified results of the test and examination must
be presented to the County Judge. A condition precedent to the issuance
of the license is a negative finding as to syphilis.
After a three day waiting period and public notice, the applicants
receive their license which is valid for thirty days. The rights of the
matrimonial contract may be solemnized, thereafter, by any regularly
ordained minister or elder, or judicial officer or notary public of Florida,
or any person performing the marriage ceremony according to the rites
and ceremonies of the Society of Friends or Quakers.
Whoever performs the marriage ceremony must, within ten days,
certify the license and return it to the County judge, who keeps a record
of all such licenses and certifications. If no certification is made, proof
of the marriage may be made by affidavits of two witnesses to the ceremony,
and this shall be recorded and have the same effect and force as if a
proper certification had been made.
Policy Limits
The legislature has excluded certain classes from the right to be
married under the regulations as prescribed by law. Miscegenation and
incestuous marriage are prohibited and penalized in Florida. Penalties
are provided against both one guilty of bigamy and one who knowingly
marries someone already married to another.
A license will not be issued to an applicant who has syphilis in a
communicable stage. However, an exception may be made when the
female applicant is pregnant. A license cannot be obtained by a male
under eighteen or a female under sixteen, with or without parental
consent, unless the applicants swear, under oath, that they are parents,
or expectant parents of a child.
Effect
In spite of these statutes it is not necessary to comply with the
detailed regulations in order to be legally married in Florida. The Florida
Supreme Court has held that the formal statutory requirements are merely
directory and do not exclude the common-law marriage (6,2). As a result,
the Supreme Court, by judicial decree, has had to establish the require-
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ments for the formation of a common-law marriage to complement the
statutory regulations for a ceremonial marriage.
EVENTS OF A COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE FORlATION
The basic fact creating the issue of common-law marriage in the courts
of Florida, is that a man and woman enter into a relationship, usually
of cohabitation, without conforming to legal requirements as to license or
ceremonial marriage.
The circumstances surrounding the cohabitation and alleged marital
relation vary greatly. These circumstances play an important role in
influencing a court's response to the question of whether or not a
common-law marriage was entered into by the parties.
Proof of a ceremonial marriage relation is evidenced by the certified
license as required by statute. The various Florida decisions on the creation
of common-law marriage show what is required for the proof, and therefore
establishment, of a common-law marriage. These requirements can be
determined by discovering how the pattern of changing circumstances
will alter the judicial ruling from case to case.
Below are described the variegated types of cases on common-law
marriage which have been before the Supreme Court of Florida. In any
particular case there usually was a combination of events with some favoring
the existence of a common-law marriage while others negate it.
Events Which Favored the Existence of a Common-Law Marriage
1. The alleged parties to the common-law marriage cohabitated as
man and wife, lived together, were known and recognized by friends and
acquaintances as husband and wife, and were generally held out to the
public as such (1,3,6,11,13,19,16,33,35,39,40,43,7,8,10,2,15,17).
2. The parties had capacity to marry (this was present or implied
in most of the cases except 38 and 25).
3. There was clearly, between the parties, a present agreement to be
married (6,9,32,33,39,27,31).
4. The actions of the parties indicated that a marriage relationship
existed.
(a) They joined in signing mortgages or other legal instruments
as husband and wife (6,33).
(b) They introduced, acknowledged, and recognized each other
as husband and wife (7,1,2,43,27).
(c) The husband so acted by putting the wife in his will and
taking out insurance in her favor (19,27), by sending birthday
cards to his wife, acknowledging her as such (33), by giving
the wife engagement and wedding rings (43,33), or by givng
and attending "wedding" parties and donating to charity as
"Mr. and Mrs." (43).
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5. Children were born to the alleged common-law spouses (35,38,28,16,
12,2,8).
Events Which Negated the Existence of a Common-law Marriage
6. The alleged spouses merely cohabited and, or lived together (22,23,
24,34,36,37,43,41,20,33,4).
7. One of the parties had no capacity to marry due to the existence
of a living spouse (38,25).
8. There was no agreement to marry (36,40).
9. There was an agreement to marry but it could have been interpreted
as a future agreement (10,34,23).
10. The cohabiting and passing as husband and wife existed for only
a short time (14,36).
11. A ceremonial marriage between the parties was,
(a) Merely discussed (13).
(b) Planned in the immediate future (23).
(c) Promised by the alleged husband for the future (10).
12. Either or both of the parties took positive actions indicating that
there had been no marriage,
(a) by signing documents or official papers as a single person, or
claiming not to be married (17,43,21,22,18,11,41).
(b) by the man referring to the woman otherwise than as his
wife (24).
13. There was a meretricious relationship and cohabitation before the
alleged common-law marriage,
(a) since one of the parties had a living spouse (24,31,29),
(b) as established by the evidence (43).
Events-Miscellaneous
14. The parties had been previously married and then divorced,
however,
(a) before the decree there was a reconciliation which amounted
to an agreement (32), or with no agreement and no attacks
on the decree (40),
(b) after the decree the parties merely lived together (41).
15. After a ceremonial marriage it was discovered that one of the
parties originally had an impediment to marriage, and,
(a) after the discovery the other party tried to annul the
marriage (16),
(b) after the discovery the other party continued the marriage
relationship (28).
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16. One of the parties to the alleged common-law marriage died and
the other wished to testify that there was an agreement to be man and
wife (12,39).
17. The alleged husband was killed while at work and his heirs collected
compensation (40,32).
PLAINTIFF
Suits asking for the aid of the courts to determine whether or not a
marriage has been effectuated, have been instituted by a variety of parties.
Among the plaintiffs who have brought these actions, have been
alleged wives, seeking to obtain the benefits of the marital status (9,39,40,
41,29,40,1,4,7,10,11,14,15,20,21,22,28,32); alleged husbands (6,16,38,31):
heirs of the alleged common-law marriage (8,13); ceremonial spouses of the
parties (5,16,28); and heirs of the individual spouses (2,18,23,24,12,43).
Common-law marriage was a crucial issue in two eases where the State
of Florida prosecuted crimes (6,19); where a bank held a property mortgage
(17); and where the United States was interpleading as an insurer (27).
Claims
The plaintiffs often manipulate the events of the particular case, along
with the technical doctrines previously enunciated by the Supreme Court,
in an attempt to give body to a basic claim of the existence, or inexistenec,
of a common-law marriage.
Objectives
The basic goal for which the plaintiff strives, and usually the ultimate
question which the court decides, is who is to take possession or share in
some type of wealth involved in the alleged marital relation. This goal
may be sought through divorce, and temporary or permanent alimony
(1,4,10,28,34,35,36,31,43,5,7,11), or by a claim of dower (14,15,21,22,33,41),
or by an attempt to control or share in an estate (6,18,24,39,43,23,31). The
possession of property is often an objective (2,8,13,12,37,28), as is the
sharing of a workmen's compensation award (32,40), or of a pension
fund (20) or of an insurance payment (27).
Some further objectives have been annulment (16,5) and damages
far libel (26). The State of Florida has also sought convictions of polygamy
(3) and accessory to murder (19).
DEFENDANT
Those against whom the pressure of the courts has been invoked arc
parties similar in position to the invokers. However, they are usually the
other participants in the contest over some wealth and will do their best
to obtain this objective themselves.
The alleged common-law husband is often in this category (1,6,4,7,10,
11,17,18,28,34,35,36,9,43,27,29). Other defendants may be the alleged wife
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(19,23,24,17,38,39,43,27,16), the heirs of one or both of the alleged spouses
(6,13,21,22,33,27,41,39,2,15,12), those in possession of an alleged spouse's
land (2,8,13), the administrator of the alleged husband's estate (14,15,21,
22,23,39,43), and a spouse by a ceremonial marriage (5,16,28,37). An
employer liable for Workmen's Compensation (32,40) and a Police Pension
Fund have also been involved in this type of suit.
Claims
The defendant will answer the claims of the invoker by presenting
the events of the case in a manner, with reference to the technical
doctrines of prior cases, so as to elicit a response which will prevent the
attainment of the plaintiff's objective. This manipulation will include
the presenting of positive claims of his own in the hopes of more effectively
influencing the court.
Objectives
The defendant desires to thwart the objectives of the plaintiff, and
to prevent any transference or possession of wealth which is claimed on
the grounds of the alleged common-law marriage.
EFFECTS OF PRIOR DECISIONS ON TIlE IssuE OF COzmoN-LAw MARRIAGE
A holding by the court that a common-law marriage took place
1,6,8,13,19,21,28,32,33,35,39,9,27,42,31), or that there was none (3,10,11,14,
18,12,20,22,23,24,34,36,37,38,41,40,29,30), has, of course, much wider rami-
fications than merely a final, official adjudication of the marital status of
the parties to the alleged marriage.
A holding that a marriage existed has been the basis for a divorce
(1,35,31); or on the establishment of a prima facie case for a common-law
marriage (33,43,7,13) the husband had to pay temporary alimony, attorney's
fees and court fees pendente lite, in a divorce suit (7,43). The effect may
be that the wife has dower rights (21,33,42), or that a spouse is the heir
of a deceased spouse (6,21,39), or that a piece of land may become the
property of the wife (28,31), or the property of the children of the
marriage (8,13). The wife may become the beneficiary of insurance on
the husband's life (27), or of a workmen's compensation award (32).
It may or may not prevent an annulment of a voidable ceremonial
marriage.
A holding of no marriage, or of no prima facie case being presented
(4,34), will prevent a divorce (36,38) and eliminate the need for the
husband to make any payments pendente lite (4,10,11,34). Since there
was no marital status on which to base any marital rights, an alleged
spouse will not be an heir (18,14), have dower rights (14,17,22,23,24,29,43),
collect a pension (20), or a workmen's compensation award (40), nor take
a share in land (37).
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RESPONSE OF TIHE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
1. Judicial Predispositions
At various times, through their decisions, the judges of Florida have
indicated their general feelings on the problem of marriage and common-law
marriage. These predispositions, as described below, and other personal
attitudes which remain undisclosed, will affect the judicial reaction to
the settlement of a case-thereby resulting in a holding as to the formation,
or not, of a common-law marriage.
Most important, the court has often expressed its lack of enthusiasm
for common-law marriage (11,17,24,32,39). While favoring the abolishment
of common-law marriage, the court feels that the legislature is the proper
branch of the government to prescribe its creation in Florida (11,24,39).
Society's participation and interest in every marriage is recognized by
the court as part of its public policy, so that the court feels that there
must be some public recognition of a valid common-law marriage as evidence
of the existence of the marriage-for the protection of the parties, their
children, and the public (11,15). Further, the court feels that to conserve
the welfare of human society and good public order, its policy is to require
a common-law marriage to be proven with clearness and exactness, to the
end that injustice may be avoided and family and property rights be pro-
tected (17).
One of the reasons why the court merely "tolerates" common-law
marriage is that its purposes and needs have disappeared. In Florida's
early development, it was a frontier state, with difficult travel and sparseness
of settlements, and those authorized to perform marriages being relatively
inaccessible, there was good reason for this method of marriage. However,
the court points out that today's conditions differ; distances have shrunk
by modem travel, and all facilities for ceremonial marriage are easily avail-
able, therefore there is no logical reason for the continued existence of
common-law marriage (24).
With reference to divorce, the court feels that the increase in recent
years, in the number of suits based on a common-law marriage, is directly
due to the elimination by the legislature of various causes of action such
as breach of promise to marry, in the so-called "heart-balm" statute6 As
a result a new procedure was established in Fincher v. Fineher (34), to be
discussed below, which made it more difficult for an alleged common-law
wife to get temporary alimony.
The overall effect of the Supreme Court's negative predisposition
toward marriages consummated without following statutory procedures is
to examine the evidence with increasing caution-placing a greater burden
on the party trying to establish the marriage (24).
6. FLA. STAT. § 771 (1953).
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2. Judicial Prescriptions-Technical Doctrine
Substantive Law
The "law" of common-law marriage is well established in Florida (22);
it is clearly valid (6,2,7,10,1l,14,21,23,39). It is in force unless expressly
modified by statute (6,2,7,39), and the Supreme Court has held that the
existing statutes are merely directory and therefore do not void common-law
marriage (6,2). The courts cannot abolish it by judicial fiat; rather, it
is up to the legislature to take the necessary steps to end common-law
marriage (11,24).
The court originally defined common-law marriage as a civil contract
relation that is valid when consummated by consent and cohabitation of
competent parties (6,2). This was later qualified in that once a present
agreement had been made, consummation was not required (9). However,
some public recognition of the existence of the relationship is required, as
the state is a party to every such agreement (15,11)
The two essentials of common-law marriage are capacity and mutual
consent. It is formed by words of common assent-per verba de praesenti-
when the parties are in each other's presence. It may be without legal
ceremony or witness, and may recite any form of words of ceremony
which give evidence of the present intent of the parties (10,11,13,14,17,19,
20,23,24,36). The Florida Supreme Court refused to recognize a future
agreement to be married, with physical consummation-per verba de futuro
cum copula-on the grounds that it was fraught with serious consequences
to the innocent who might enter marriage on a basis so nearly illicit
(10,11,23,34).
Once a marriage is effectuated, it remains in full force, thereafter,
until it is dissolved by law, or the death of one of the parties (15,21,39).
The only difference between a common-law marriage and a formal marriage
is the method of expressing consent, and once married, the parties are
as effectively married as if by a legal ceremony (15,26). It follows, therefore,
that even if a common-law marriage is for business and convenience pur-
poses, this is not enough to hold it illegal (43).
A common-law marriage is valid, though incepted and consummated
in a state where it is not recognized, if the parties returned to Florida
and continued to live openly as man and wife (32). If one of the parties
has a living spouse, a common-law marriage is incapable of being con-
tracted (25).
A federal district court, interpreting the Florida decisions, held
that a proxy marriage created a valid common-law marriage since it satisfied
the requirements of intent, consent, agreement, and proof (27).
Presumptions
The Supreme Court of Florida has established a number of pre-
sumptions which are to be applied whenever the issue of common-law
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marriage appears in a case. A person alleging a common-law marriage has
to prove a prima facie case, and once this is done the burden shifts to
those attacking the marriage (33,36,39,43) for, generally, the burden of
proof is on he who asserts the illegality of a marriage (5,21,24,33,39,43). It
is not required that there be a preponderance of the evidence to prove that
a common-law marriage was formed (41 ).
A presumption of marriage may be established by cohabitation and
repute of the parties as husband and wife, and this will make out a prima
facie case of marriage (1,3,13,36). Cohabitation as man and wife means
living together-having the same habitation-and is not a mere sojourn,
visit, or living together for a short time (13). Repute is a general under-
standing by neighbors and the public that the parties arc living as man
and wife and their relations arc not meretricious (13).
Proof of clandestine or concubinage relations between the parties will
rebut any presumptions of marriage (13). Whenever a relationship is
shown to have been meretricious in its inception, it is presumed to have
continued in this manncr and the burden shifts to the party alleging the
marriage to show the metamorphosis from concubinage to marriage (24,37).
However, a discussion of ceremonial marriage from time to time does not
overcome the presumption of marriage (13).
Once a marriage is forned, whether common-law or legal, there is a
presumption that the parties were competent and legally qualified to
consent (21).
A formal marriage, originally invalid because one of the parties had
an impediment, presumably ripens into a common-law marriage when the
impediment is removed (16,29). However, if information of the impedi-
ment was fraudulently withheld by one of the parties, the innocent party
may get an annulment in spite of the ratification (28).
When the state is prosecuting under the criminal statutes, it always
has the burden of proof on any question of common-law marriage, whether
to prove or disprove its existence (13,19).
Procedure
As has been described earlier, the person alleging the existence of a
common-law marriage must prove a prima facie case and then the burden
shifts to the attackers of the marriage (33,36,39,43). The person claiming
the marriage must establish the agreement between the parties (36).
Normally, in divorce suits, an order of temporary alimony, attorney's
fees, and court costs peudente lite, is awarded on the establishment of a
marriage between the parties (4,5,11). When, however, the divorce was
based on an alleged common-law marriage, the original requirement in
Florida was that at least a prima facic case of the marriage appear, by
proof or admission, before taking testimony to determine the amount of
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the temporary payments, since if the marriage relationship did not exist,
the defendant husband was not liable (5,11,34). In a recent reaction to
what it termed an increase in divorce suits founded on alleged common-law
marriages, the highest court of Florida, in the Fincher case (34), established
a new procedure-on the ground that a stronger rule was needed to
handle this type of case. The court said that the chancellor should sever
the issues, and, before any other hearing, should determine conclusively
whether or not a common law marriage actually exists. As an alternative,
the chancellor can defer a hearing on temporary payments pendente lite
until the final hearing, unless the exigencies of the particular case should, in
equity and good conscience, dictate severance immediately.
The court felt that the new procedure was one consonant with public
policy and equitable principle. However, it was very emphatically pointed
out that the new procedure did not abrogate or modify the rule that when
a prima facie case was established the burden shifted to the defendant.
Therefore the Fincher case did not alter any substantive prescriptions on
common-law marriage; it merely established a new procedure in divorce
cases.
Evidence
The best evidence of a common-law marriage is the testimony of
the contracting parties or those present at the time of the agreement
(13,36). However, when the parties so desire, a common-law marriage
can be established by cohabitation and repute when the best evidence
is not available (13,36). Cohabitation and repute are merely evidence of
the agreement and their proof is not required. Nevertheless, these cir-
cumstances, even when present, do not establish a common-law marriage
if there has been no consent or desire to create one (11,18,36).
Since the marriage may be in any form of words or ceremony, the
only requirement is that the circumstances give evidence of present intent
and agreement of the parties (11,13,14,17,19,20,23,34,36).
Because there can be no common-law marriage by future agreement,
any express future agreement is absolutely fatal to a claim of marriage,
for it shows mental reservations incompatible with consent (10,11,23,34).
However, discussion of ceremonial marriage, from time to time, is not
necessarily inconsistent with a prior common-law marriage (13).
The evidence of cohabitation which is necessary to show the marriage,
is the living together of the parties in the same habitation (13). Repute
must be supported by positive proof that, generally, it was understood by
friends, neighbors, and acquaintances that the parties are living as man
and wife, and their relations were not meretricious (13). It is clear that
the cohabitation and repute which will show a common-law marriage
must be open and public, so that by their conduct, the parties are known
as husband and wife (15,11).
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Once a marital status is formed, subsequent acts of concealment or
maintenance of secrecy concerning the marriage are not sufficient evidence
to destroy it (1 5,21,39). Evidence of a meretricious relationship is estab-
lished when an alleged spouse was ineligible to marry (24,37). For
example, if a party is shown to have a living spouse, then this fact may
be used as evidence that the part)' was incapable of contracting a common-
law marriage (25).
Under Florida's "deadman's statute," a party cannot testify with refer-
ence to the alleged marriage when the other party is deceased, if the
party is interested in the outcome of the suit (15,12). "Interest" means
interest in the cause, and in the outcome of action (12). However, if the
interested party is questioned about the agreement on cross examination,
the bars are down, so to speak, and his testimony is admissible (21,33,39).
Response in Florida Decisions to All Factors
The environment of each case seemingly influences decisions on the
issue of common-law marriage. A careful study of the cases indicates that
the future effects of a decision also appear to be influential.
The Supreme Court of Florida shows a tendency to find that the
events in doubtful cases show no common-law marriage, when the effect
of an opposite decision would be to give an alleged wife a share in the
man's estate, or a divorce and alimony. Of course, as discussed below,
if the events clearly show a marriage to be either formed or not formed,
the court will rule accordingly. This tendency to hold against the formation
of a common-law marriage is to be expected in the light of the court's
negative predispositions toward non-statutory marriage formation.
The court may effectuate the result of "no common-law marriage"
by upholding the decision of the lower court (8,20,29,30,22); by finding
that a prima facie case of marriage was not made out (37,41,4); or that
a clandestine relationship rebutted the presumption of marriage (24).
The court also has held that there was no present agreement (14,18,36,40),
or that the agreement was a future one (10,11,23,34).
The events which elicited the holding that no common-law marriage
was formed, were the lack of a present agreement (10,23,34); a meretricious
relationship between the parties (24,29); and acts by either, or both, of
the parties indicating that there was no marriage (11,18,22,24). The fact
that the parties merely lived together without repute of man and wife
(18,20,23,24,34,36,37,41,40,30), or that the living together was for just a
short time (12,32), carried great weight.
The court has ruled in favor of a common-law marriage by holding
that the presumption in favor of marriage has not been overcome (1,8,13,
21,28,33,35); by finding that a prima facie case of marriage was made
out (43,7); or bv a decision that a present agreement took place
(6,32,39,31,9,27).
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The events which caused the court to declare that a marriage was
formed, included a clear, present agreement between the parties (32,6,33,
39,31,9,27); acts by the parties which show that a marriage took place
(1,19,43,7,27); and, of course, cohabitation and repute of marriage (1,6,8,
13,19,21,33,35,39,43,7,15).
Often the presentation of the events by the parties, appear conflicting
as to the circumstances of the marriage. When there is little conflict,
and the events are clearly favorable to one side or the other, the court
responds along the line indicated by the events. However, as already noted,
when the claims of the events, as put in evidence by the parties, are not
positivc in one direction, the court appears to give more weight to the
negative aspects against formation of the marriage.
Probably, most important, is the public recognition of an alleged
marriage as shown by cohabitation and repute as man and wife, since in
most instances there is no clear evidence as to the alleged agreement.
Public acceptance of a couple as husband and wife, and the couple's
constant actions as man and wife, appear to have great influence on
responses by the Supreme Court.
INFLUENCE OF DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
rhe Florida Supreme Court has been greatly influenced by the
decisions of other jurisdictions on the issue of common-law marriage.
These decisions have had their greatest impact in the original establishment
of the basic technical doctrine of common-law marriage. They were given
as authority for the introduction of the doctrine as part of the judicial
prescription of Florida. However, as the number of Florida cases increased,
the Supreme Court has relied less and less on external responses but rather
looked to Florida cases for its authority.
The authority for the validity of common-law marriage, unless
expressly modified by statute, is a United States Supreme Court decision
(6,2). The essentials of common-law marriage, per verba de praesenti,
were enunciated with reference to technical doctrine, of the United States
Supreme Court, Rhode Island, New York, Texas, Colorado, Illinois, Okla-
homa, and Alabama. These same authorities were cited, by the Florida
courts, as authority for the proposition that marriage per verba de futuro
cuM copula was outside the policy limits of a common-law marriage (10).
The legal effect of a common-law marriage being equivalent to a
ceremonial marriage is based on decisions of Wisconsin (10), Missouri,
New York, Minnesota, Colorado, and the United States Supreme Court
(21). The need for public recognition of the common-law marriage was
found in the cases of Texas, Michigan, and Illinois (15), while the putting
of the burden of proof on the party alleging the illegality of the marriage
was a doctrine of Iowa (13).
The Supreme Court referred to decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, and of Colorado, in establishing the rule that clandestine relations
rcbutted the presumption of marriage (13). A Washington decision first
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stated that discussion of a ceremonial marriage did not overcome a pre-
sumption of marriage (13). The doctrine that cohabitation and repute
will not establish a marriage, if there was no consent or desire to do so,
has Texas authority (I I).
The most recent reference to a decision of another jurisdiction came
in 1951 when the authority of the United States Supreme Court was
invoked for the proposition that a common-law marriage was valid in
Florida though its inception was in a state which did not recognize such
marriages (32).
TRENDS
There has been an apparent shift in attitude, of the Supreme Court
of Florida, over the years, from the acceptance of common-law marriage
as perhaps nceessary in a sparsely settled large state, to the present disfavor
with which the court looks at non-statutory formation of marriage.
Through the many cases which have decided this issue, the court
has established the judicial requirements for the formation of common-law
marriage. Unlike statutory marriage, the satisfaction of legal requirements
is not determined before the alleged marriage, but rather by a court's
ruling, usually long after the event took place. There is a present tendency
for the Supreme Court to be more stringent in its approach, when
determining whether the requirements were met.
In one area, divorce, this trend of negativism has clearly shown itself.
In establishing the Fincher (34) procedure, the court has made it more
difficult for an alleged common-law wife to obtain a divorce. She will
get all or nothing under the new procedure. If the ruling is that no
common-law marriage existed, the wife must bear all the varied expenses
of the litigation, which would ordinarily be born by the defendant husband
in the case of a ceremonial marriage.
The number of cases presenting the issue of common-law marriage
to the Supreme Court has been on the increase. In the seventy-one years,
from 1869 until 1940, twenty cases were before the court. From 1940 to
1954, twenty-three cases were heard-more than in the entire history of
the Florida court up to that time. It is interesting to note that of the
twenty-three cases, nineteen took place after 1945. Finally, from 1950 to
1954, there were a total of fourteen cases on common-law marriage before
the Supreme Court.
The search for affection has lcd to the establishment of relationships
which at a later date are alleged to have been common-law marriages.
The trend of the litigation in this area shows that the courts are called
upon to decide whether or not the relationship actually was a marriage,
so that it may be decided if the parties are entitled to the rights which
would arise out of the marital status.
CLARIFICATION OF GOALS
The need for affection is basic to the human personality, therefore,
the proper objective for this value is to allow the widest possible oppor-
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tunitics for its realization. However, these opportunities must necessarily
be limited by the community's prescriptions as to the proper institutionaliza-
tion of the affection value.
Marriage is the institution which is accepted by our society as
the proper crystallization of the goal of affection. By legislative prescription,
certain policy limits have been placed on the formation of marriage. These
limits should be observed for all marriages and there should not be a
method of marriage which ignores these limits. If the limits are
unrealistic, and they do not appear to be so, a proper procedure is to have
the legislature re-evaluate them.
The judicial prescriptions on common-law marriage have, for the
most part, been necessary due to a conflict over wealth which arises
because the rights growing out of the marital status are at issue. It is
better to require statutory marriage, for then the formation problem is
clearly settled and litigation over this point would be ended.
Under the existing law, where the issue of the formation of a
common-law marriage is before the courts, and where there is a satisfactory
showing that a marriage took place, those having rights under the marriage
should be fully protected. However, where a woman is trying to use a
meretricious relationship, in fact and intent, as a springboard towards
obtaining wealth under an invalid claim of right, the courts should be
very strict in scrutinizing the claim. The tendency of the courts, in
making a formation difficult to establish in border-line cases, is acceptable,
since common-law marriage does not meet with favor.
Common-law marriage is no longer necessary in Florida. Licenses
and persons who can perform ceremonies are easily obtained throughout
the state, so that there is no valid reason why the legislative procedure
for the formation of a marriage should be ignored.
RECO.MMENDATIONS
It is suggested that action be taken -by the legislature to abolish
common-law marriage, by providing as valid only those marriages that
conform to statutory formalities.7 There is no point to establishing detailed
requirements for the formation of a marriage-for society's protection-
if these requirements are to be ineffective. Today the limits on marriage,
as prescribed by the legislature, may be safely ignored.
A law invalidating the common-law marriage in Florida would end
the conflict which normally arises when there is a common-law marriage.
7. There are a number of alternatives to allowing the common-law marriage
situation to continue on as before. These are possibilities open to either the legislature
or the courts.
The legislature could end common-law marriage by adding to the present policy
limits the further limit that only marriages which are formed under statutory regulations
are valid.
A less stringent regulation would be to provide for the registration of common-las
marriages. This would be done by both parties to the marriage swearing affidavits
to the effect that the formation took place. Unless this were done the marriage would
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It would stop unnecessary litigation over wealth; the usual occurrence afte
the affection relation is terminated.8
It would be better for the legislature to act, rather than for the
Supreme Court, for example, to alter the presumptions, or add a blood
test requirement. The attendant publicity-to a statute making common-
law marriage invalid-would give fair warning to those who contemplate
entering such a status. 'Whereas, if the courts made it increasingly
difficult to prove the common-law marriage, injury might result to the
parties of a bona fide common-law marriage, inasmuch as the litigation
on the matter could readily arise long after the parties entered into the
relationship.
If the legislature fails to act, the new procedure for divorce, established
in the Fincher case, should be followed. If there actually was a common-law
marriage, the woman loses nothing by the severance of the issues, for on
the determination of a valid marriage she will receive support and other
necessary payments. On the other hand, if there was no marriage, the
defendant does not have to make any payments, and his property is
not tied up by the possibility of dower rights. rhe procedure protects
the worthy and does not allow others to gain unwarranted benefits.
not be considered a legal one. This regulation could be made stricter if the requirements
were added that before a registration could be made, the parties would also have to
prove they had negative blood tests before the marriage took place, similarly to the
statutory rules.
The Supreme Court might continue to uphold common-law marriage with its
present attitude of carefully scrutinizing such claims so that it is very difficult to
establish the marriage.
There are some alterative steps the court could take to make proving a common-law
marriage still more difficult. The first would be to change the presumptions so that
in all cases the presumption would be against the formation having taken place. The
effect would be that the person claiming the marriage took place would have to
prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.
Another step the court could take would be to alter the essentials of a common-law
marriage to conform to those evident in the statute. At present the essentials are
capacity and consent, which originally were the only effect of statutory formation.
However, the legislature in 1945 added the blood test requirement. '['he court, too,
could now add the blood test as one of the essentials necessary to prove common-law
marriage. This unquestionably would make it very difficult to prove the formation
of a common-law marriage.
The greater the burden that any of these alternatives placed on the parties, the
greater would be the pressure towards conforming to the statutory procedure for
marriage.
8. If the legislature abolished common-law marriage, as a means of protecting
women who have been held out as legal wives, the Supreme Court might introduce
the New York doctrine, as established in Kranse v. Kranse, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d
290 (1940), that, in these circumstances, the man has some obligation of support.
Since this doctrine has not been fully elaborated, it is only tenatively offered with
the further suggestion, that if used, the holding out ought to be for a long time
and the obligation of support be for a relatively short time. Under this doctrine, the
woman could have no claim to the benefits derived from the status of a wife.
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In summation, the abolishment of common-law marriage is in the
hands of the legislature. It should take this step in order that the policy
limits on marriage formation, already established for the protection of
the community, should be obeyed and effectively carried out.
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